ABSTRACT For location-aware applications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), it is important to ensure that sensor nodes can get correct locations in a hostile WSNs. Sybil attacks, which are vital threats in WSNs, especially in the distributed WSNs. They can forge one or multiple identities to decrease the localization accuracy, or sometimes to collapse the whole localization systems. In this paper, a novel lightweight sybilfree (SF)-APIT algorithm is presented to solve the problem of sybil attacks in APIT localization scheme, which is a popular range-free method and performs at individual node in a purely distributed fashion. The proposed SF-APIT scheme requires minimal overhead for wireless devices and works well based on the received signal strength. Simulations demonstrate that SF-APIT is an effective scheme in detecting and defending against sybil attacks with a high detection rate in distributed wireless localization schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), location information of nodes plays an important role in many location-aware applications, such as geographical routing [15] , [16] , [25] , environmental monitoring, tracking applications, network coverage checking [24] , and location-based information querying [13] . In these applications, it is useless to gather the nodes' information without locations. In addition, correct locations are necessary, otherwise, it is still meaningless to get the location information. In many localization systems, a small proportion of nodes equipped with GPS (i.e., anchor nodes or localized nodes) is a feasible way in the deployment of WSNs due to the high cost of GPS technology. Anchor nodes with location information can assist sensor nodes which are unaware locations to get their locations [1] .
WSNs are easier to be destroyed by threats and risks if they are deployed in an adversarial environment due to their open and broadcast communication medium. Sybil attacks are considered as one of the most harmful types of attacks in WSNs. Douceur [5] first introduced the term sybil attack, which tries to forge multiple identities in the context of peerto-peer distributed networks. In an anchor-based localization system, if an adversary compromises an anchor node, the malicious anchor node can generate multiple identities by creating new locations or impersonating locations of existing legitimate ones to reduce the localization accuracy. In some applications, such as the forest fire detection or battlefield surveillance, incorrect locations may result in deaths of many people. Cryptographic methods are a normal solution for these problems. However, the high computational cost and the large storage requirement on per node by using cryptographic method hinder the efficiency to defend against sybil attacks.
Motivated by the above observations, we provide a secure localization scheme against sybil attacks in distributed WSNs. We design a novel sybil-free localization method. APIT localization scheme [7] is utilized to support the detection work. Why do we select APIT? Because it is a popular range-free localization method, which is simple to understand and easy to deploy. The sybil attack is selected as our defending target since it is a particularly challenging attack. Once they launch in WSNs, the localization accuracy can be affected significantly. Based on APIT, we propose a SybilFree APIT localization scheme named SF-APIT, to detect sybil attacks in APIT localization scheme. Our approach only uses the Receive Signal Strength (RSS) received from neighboring anchor nodes to detect sybil attacks, which does not have much overhead on sensor nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related works. The problem statements are given in Section III, which includes the basic APIT localization scheme and the impact of sybil attack on APIT. In Section IV, we present the system model which consists of the network model and attack models. Section V illustrates the sybil-free APIT localization scheme which includes the character of sybil attacks, SF-APIT detection scheme, a walk through the SF-APIT detection scheme as well as RSS threshold determining model. The overhead analysis is given in Section VI. Simulation results and performance evaluation are shown in Section VII. Finally, Section VIII presents the conclusion and future work.
II. RELATED WORK A. SECURE LOCALIZATION
In recent years, a variety of secure localization algorithms were proposed. A robust location system (ROPE) was proposed by Lazos et al. [12] , which is a secure localization algorithm. In ROPE, the locations of sensors are checked before the process of data gathering. However, it is unsuitable in low-cost WSNs due to the requirement of nanosecond precision counter. Park and Shin [18] proposed a secure localization scheme for WSNs by measuring the signal strength and scaling the multiple dimensions. Although fewer hardware resources were required by this method, it is only effective to defend against the naive adversaries which try to falsify the locations to random points. Capkun et al. [2] and Rasmussen et al. [21] proposed secure localization schemes by using covert base stations (CBS) and mobile base station (MBS). In CBS case, distances by using node's reported location and CBS' location are calculated first, then each CBS compares the calculated distances and rejects the reported location if the difference is beyond a threshold. In [14] , local semidefinite programming technology was employed to proposed a distributed method, which improves the localization accuracy in WSNs. A secure locationing system was proposed by Perazzo et al. [20] to provide a secure localization system by leveraging the enlargement attack resistance of wireless distance bounding protocols. Few anchors are used to cover the same area by improving the verifiable multilateration. Based on [20] , paper [19] replaced the fixed anchor nodes with a single mobile drone to securely localize nodes, which completely eliminates the need for an expensive anchor infrastructure.
B. SECURE LOCALIZATION IN SYBIL ATTACK
To achieve the secure localization in a WSN with sybil attacks, paper [10] first detected the sybil attack by using locators which equipped with many higher-power directional antennas. It is assumed that the locators are trusted and cannot be compromised. Each locator knows its own location and transmits beacon information with locator's location. Sensor node obtains its location by listening beacon information sent by locators and then computing an approximate location based on the received locations. An overlapping antenna region was calculated by using a majority-vote scheme. The final location of the unlocalized node is the ''center of gravity'' of the overlapping antenna region. In addition, a shared global symmetric key is preloaded to encrypt the transmitted beacon information of locators. Neighbor locator density of the unlocalized node and other factors are considered to filter out sybil attacks. However, SeRLoc is feasible with the assumption that there is no jamming of the wireless medium and the locator information can be tampered by attacks, which is not secure. In addition, it needs extra hardware support, such as the directional antenna. Based on the work of paper [10] , HiRLoc [11] further improved the localization resolution by using antenna rotations and multiple transmit power levels. This scheme is also tolerant against sybil attacks. However, HiRLoc increases the computational and communication complexity.
Paper [4] proposed an RSSI-based Scheme for sybil detection. For each received message, the received signal strength (RSS) was measured by the receiver. Then three cooperating nodes exchanged its obtained values and calculated the ratio, which would be stored in the message senders record in neighbor's database. One distinctive ratio is associated with a distinctive node location. If the differences of RSS ratios of nodes are within a predefined threshold, then the receiver can treat these senders as sybil nodes. Wen et al. [23] solved the sybil attack problem in localization by using time difference of arrival (TDOA) method. TDOA ratio is associated with each sender's identity. Once there are two different identities with the same TDOA ratio, a sybil attack is detected. Angle of arrival (AOA) based mechanism was proposed in [27] , which is called TEBA. This detection method takes advantage of the fact that, all the multiple sybil identities generated by a malicious node are from the same physical location. If the signal phase difference below a trusted threshold for adjacent sensor nodes, these nodes are identified as sybil attacks. A secure localization algorithm named TMCA was proposed in paper [22] . The TMCA is a distributed algorithm based on the cooperation of non-beacon neighbor nodes to defense sybil attacks and some other attacks.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
We depict the APIT localization scheme [7] in this section. In addition, its vulnerability against the sybil attack and the impact of this attack on the location accuracy are also described.
A. BASIC APIT LOCALIZATION SCHEME
In 2003, APIT was first proposed by He et al. [7] , which is a distributed, range-free localization scheme. It is cheap to deploy and easy to implement. Only RSS information is needed to localize sensor nodes. Later, Plenty of researchers did improved work based on APIT [3] , [17] , [26] . The APIT scheme can be implemented by four major steps.
The first step is beacon exchange. Anchor nodes broadcast beacon messages (ID, Location) first. After each sensor node builds its own neighbor anchor list, sensor nodes broadcast their neighbor list. Having received messages from neighbor nodes, each sensor node merges all received anchor information and stores them.
The second step is PIT Testing. Firstly, the perfect PIT test is introduced. It aims to determine whether one sensor node with the unknown location is inside the triangle of anchor nodes or not. For example, in Fig. 1 , if the sensor node M is inside triangle ABC of anchor nodes, no matter what direction it shifts. Then, M is nearer or further from at least one anchor node of ABC. In Fig. 2 , if M is outside ABC, a direction which M is closer or further to all anchor nodes of ABC can be found. However, in the practical static network, the perfect PIT test is infeasible. The approximation of the perfect PIT test is used to judge the location of sensor nodes, which is based on the relatively high node density of the localization networks.
APIT uses the neighbor information to imitate the node movement in the PIT Testing step. An explanation is given in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 . If no neighbor of M is further or closer to all three anchor nodes of ABC simultaneously, M is inside ABC. Otherwise, M is outside ABC. The third step is APIT aggregation. A grid SCAN algorithm is used after the PIT Testing to aggregate the inside and outside triangles results, which is computed to find the maximum overlapping area. Based on this, the Center of Gravity (COG) calculation in the last step is employed to calculate the center of gravity for location estimation.
B. IMPACT OF SYBIL ATTACK ON APIT
In the APIT localization scheme, sybil attacks are relatively easy to happen but difficult to detect and prevent, because APIT only uses RSS to localize sensor nodes. Anchor nodes, which assist sensor nodes to find their location, usually equip with more energy, larger storage and higher transmission power. If anchor nodes are tampered and generate multiple sybil attacks, it is difficult to estimate locations of sensor node correctly. In detail, sybil attack can affect the first step (beacon exchange) by making the neighbor list abnormal. Then, the entire localization scheme is deteriorated due to all following steps based on the first step. Fig. 5 depicts an example of this attack. A, B and C are anchor nodes with locations (x A , y A ), (x B , y B ) and (x C , y C ), respectively. M, 1, 2, 3 and 4 are sensor nodes. All sensor nodes and anchor nodes are neighbors. Anchor node A is tampered. Then, it becomes a malicious node generating two sybil anchor nodes by changing the location and ID: A with location (x A , y A ) and A with location (x A , y A ). Anchor node M is inside the triangle ABC, but it is outside the triangle A BC and A BC. In this situation, the location of sensor node M estimated by APIT is incorrect.
Another impact caused by sybil attacks on APIT is energy consumption. Sensor nodes have to store more neighbor anchor nodes and transmit more neighbors under attack, which costs more energy than in a benign network. It can decrease the network lifetime significantly, especially in WSNs with limited resource.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model is described in this section, consisting of the network model and attack models.
A. NETWORK MODEL
In SF-APIT scheme, all nodes are static and uniformly distributed in the simulation area. Anchor nodes, which are aware of their locations by GPS or manual configuration, have larger communication ranges and more energy storage. Sensor nodes are unaware of their locations and trustable. When one node broadcasts a message, only the nodes in the communication range scope of it can receive the message and those nodes are defined as neighboring nodes.
B. ATTACK MODELS
If one malicious node illegally claims multiple identities to pretend as other nodes or new nodes on a single physical device, all identities of this malicious node are sybil attacks [5] . For example, in Fig. 6 , malicious anchor node C j generates multiple sybils with different location information. Two sybils, C k and C h send location parameters (id k , x k , y k ), (id h , x h , y h ) by using two different identities id k and id h , respectively. Sensor node receives two different localization information. However, both of them are sent by C j and not real, which leads to an incorrect calculation of the location of sensor node M. Malicious anchor nodes generate sybil attacks in the following ways in the distributed WSNs. In the first type, a malicious anchor node only creates one sybil at a time in the network. In the second type of sybil attack, many sybils can be generated by one malicious node concurrently, called the simultaneous sybil attack. This attack tries to gain more resources, information, access and so on, which leads to a higher location estimation error than that of a single sybil in WSNs, the simultaneous sybil attack scene is considered in our scheme. Sybil attack can steal the identity or location or both from the existing legitimate nodes. Sybil attack can also fabricate a new identity or location or both to pretend as a new anchor node (for example, creating the arbitrary identity or location or both).
In conclusion, in this paper, one malicious anchor node can generate the direct and simultaneous sybil attacks with both fabricated and stolen identities or locations or both identities and locations in order to maximize its benefits to affect the location accuracy.
V. SYBIL-FREE APIT LOCALIZATION SCHEME
In this section, the proposed sybil attack resistant localization scheme, called Sybil-Free APIT based localization (SF-APIT) is illustrated. SF-APIT can localize sensor nodes with sybil attacks. APIT localization algorithm is well known and many research did improvement work on localization accuracy of APIT. In this paper, our aim is to improve the localization accuracy of APIT in a hostile WSNs with sybil attacks. Symbols in this paper are given in table 1.
A. CHARACTER OF SYBIL ATTACKS
Sbyil attacks are virtual identities of malicious node, so they have the same physical place. The RSS received from the same physical place should be closed and the distance of that should be almost the same, although it is affected by the random noise, environmental bias and multipath effects [6] . For example, in Fig. 7 , the malicious anchor node C j generates two sybil nodes C k and C h . The sensor node M is in the communication range of C j . After sensor node M receives the beacon location information, C j , C k and C h are in the same circle with the acceptable estimation error and the sensor node M is the centroid point of this circle.
B. SF-APIT DETECTION SCHEME
Like we discussed in section III-A, APIT consists of four steps: Beacon exchange, PIT Testing, APIT aggregation as well as COG calculation. SF-APIT detection performs in the second step (PIT Testing). In PIT Testing, once the triangle of anchor nodes is selected, each pair of anchor nodes in the selected triangle will be checked by equation (1) and k are the suspect nodes. Otherwise, they are not suspect nodes.
If we use two sensor nodes as trustable nodes to check sybil attacks, some legitimate nodes might be judged as sybil nodes. An example is given in Fig. 8 . M and 1 are two sensor nodes while A and B are two legitimate anchor nodes. If A and B are located exactly on the cross points of two circles. The center of one circle is M and the other is 1. The radius of one circle is the distance between M and A and correspondingly, the other is the distance between 1 and B. In this scene, the legitimate nodes A and B can be judged as sybil nodes incorrectly. In order to avoid this, we use at least three trustable nodes to judge sybil attacks. Anchor nodes j and k are sybil nodes which can be obtained by Definition 1 and Eq. (2), where f (S) = p p=1 S p . If there are sybil attacks in the selected triangle, this triangle will not be used in the next step,
Definition 1: The anchor node j and k are sybil attacks, as long as that more than three sensor nodes checked the received RSS from the jth and kth anchor node and all of them satisfy equation (1) .
The Pseudo code of SF-APIT is given in algorithm 1.
C. A WALK THROUGH THE SF-APIT DETECTION SCHEME
In this section, an example is presented to further explain the SF-APIT algorithm according to Fig. 3 .
• Phase 1: anchor nodes, such as node A, B and C broadcast 'Hello' message first. After receiving the beacons from anchor nodes, sensor nodes build its neighbor anchor table (Anchor ID, Location, Signal Strength), like node M and 1 with its neighboring table 2 and 3, respectively.
• Phase 2: after all sensor nodes exchanging their neighboring tables, a merged table 4 is obtained by combining all received anchor nodes information.
• Phase 3: SF-APIT selects one triangle from the node's 
Both anchor node L h and L k are sybil nodes. Delete them and broadcast. Continue.
AddPositiveTriangle(T i , 1). end end Find the area with Max values. Estimated the location of sensor node using Center of Gravity (COG) algorithm. Output: Locations (x, y) of sensor nodes. column of the node's table 4 to check the sybil attack by equation (2) . If (A, B) anchor nodes are checked by sensor node M , 1 and 2 by equation (1) and all results VOLUME 6, 2018 are S = 1, anchor nodes A and B are sybil nodes. The next step will not be executed on this triangle. If (A, B) , (B, C) and (A, C) are good anchor nodes, APIT runs on every column of the node's table 4 to check the RSS of neighboring sensor nodes. If there is no neighboring node that has consistently larger or smaller RSS from A, B and C, then M is outside ABC. Otherwise, M is inside.
• Phase 4: step 3 is repeated to iterate all combination of three anchor nodes in table 4.
• Phase 5: after all iterations are finished, the area with maximum overlap will be find and the final location estimation is the center of gravity of this area.
D. DETERMINING ERROR RANGE THRESHOLD OF RSS READINGS
If RSS is from the one physical location, they will not exactly equal due to random noises, environment bias, and multipath effects [28] . However, they are close to each other and will fluctuate around a mean value. The error range threshold of RSS readings can be determined through the empirical training. During the offline phase, a set of anchor nodes are uniformly deployed over the experimental area. All nodes are static. Each node broadcasts ''hello'' message to its neighbor nodes. Then, the anchor node j calculates the distance d rss ji from node j to node i by equation (3) [9] . At the same time, the real distance d real ji from node j to node i is computed by equation (4) . Based on that, the mean error value of RSS can be obtained by equation (5), where C 2 N is the combination. Then, the error range threshold τ of RSS readings is τ = +e, where e is a small fluctuate value,
VI. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
The computation cost as well as storage cost are analyzed in this section. The set of anchor nodes and sensor nodes are {N a } and {N s }, respectively. Since SF-APIT uses only RSS as a way to detect sybil attacks which only performs in the step of PIT Testing of APIT algorithm, the communication cost and storage cost are less. 1. Computation cost: according to the description in Section V-C, in the first and second step of SF-APIT, it does not have any communication cost since they are part of APIT algorithm. In the third step, if the target sensor node M receives beacons from the number of K anchor nodes, the maximum communication cost is
, where C 2 3 is the cost of selecting paired anchor nodes in each triangle; C 3 K is the cost for selecting the triangles from the number of K anchor nodes. If we find paired anchor nodes in one triangle, we will delete them from the neighbor list of the sensor node. Then, in the next step, the combination number of triangles is less than C 3 K . Thus, the whole communication cost for each sensor node is less than
Storage cost: each anchor node needs 1 bit to store the flag related sybil attack. The storage of one node includes 4 KB of RAM for data and 512 kB of flash memory [8] . Thus, the storage cost of SF-APIT is very small.
VII. SIMULATIONS
The simulation area is 300m × 300m. The communication range of sensor node and anchor node are 60m and 120m, respectively. The ratio of anchor nodes to sensor nodes is one to ten. One malicious node can generate two sybil attacks by randomly changing ID or location or both of them. We run 30 times of the proposed SF-APIT method to obtain average results. All simulations are done on a Lenovo G490 laptop, with an Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-3230M CPU at 2.60GHz and 6GB (DDR3 1600MHz) of RAM. We used Matlab R2014a.
A. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
For the simulation evaluations, we use Detection Rate (DR) and Localization Estimation Error (LEE) which is normalized to units of node radio range R, under different circumstances. The definitions of these metrics are given as,
B. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To analyse the impact of the sybil attack and the ability of SF-APIT to detect attacks, we first present the comparison of the average detection rate over different sizes of malicious anchor nodes and legitimate anchor nodes. Then, we analyze the comparison of the average localization error over different sizes of legitimate anchor nodes. detection rate. This is because the chance that no legitimate nodes are around a sybil node decreases with the number of legitimate nodes increase. Thus the detection rate of the scene with 30 legitimate nodes can achieve more than 90%.
1) COMPARISON OF AVERAGE DETECTION RATE

2) COMPARISON OF AVERAGE LOCALIZATION ERROR
The estimation location error varying with the number of anchor (beacon) nodes is given in Fig. 10 . The number of sybil attacks is 6 and the number of legitimate anchor nodes increases from 10 to 30. In Fig. 10 , three scenes are illustrated. The blue line is the scene without sybil attack. The second scene corresponding to the red line has the sybil attacks and with SF-APIT detection scheme. The last one which is the green line in Fig. 10 , has the sybil attacks but without SF-APIT detection scheme. We observe that with the number of legitimate anchor nodes increase, the localization estimation error decreases. The localization estimation error of APIT method achieves 0.36R on average when there is no sybil attack existing. When APIT method is attacked by sybil attacks, the average localization estimation error increases to 0.69R. SF-APIT deletes sybil attacks in APIT and the average localization estimation error is 0.48R, which improves the localization accuracy of APIT.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Sybil attack has a serious impact on the normal operations of WSNs, especially on the distributed WSNs. The detection of such attack is a big challenge in the real world. The localization schemes, like APIT, are easily destroyed by sybil attacks due to the high density of sensor nodes and the powerful anchor nodes. In this paper, a lightweight sybil attack detection scheme, named SF-APIT, is proposed to improve the localization accuracy of APIT using only RSS information. The proposed SF-APIT scheme can be deployed easily because it does not require the hardware support. The communication and storage cost of it is very small. From the simulation results, we can see that SF-APIT can help sensor nodes to obtain correct locations efficiently in the distributed WSNs with sybil attacks.
